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ABSTRACT 
Private uses of prison labor are illegal internationally, and not without reason. A lack of public 
oversight and regulations of wages mean that prison labor is often exploited in exchange for 
increased profitability for private prisons and sometimes the private companies they contract 
with. This paper will explicate the ways in which private uses of prison labor contribute to wage 
and employment precarity and ultimately cost numerous non incarcerated low wage individuals 
in the United States their jobs and livelihoods. It offers potential policy solutions and paths 
forward for new research to better link the sociological and economic considerations of this 
issue.   
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Introduction 
 Ethical consumption is an ever increasing trend in modern consumerism in the United 
States. Movements towards fair trade or local production are wide sweeping, and boycotts of 
companies found to use unethical sources of labor abroad are increasingly common. However, 
what many do not realize is the extent to which the goods they utilize on a daily basis are made 
through unethical practices. Supply chains are necessarily muddled by the global economy, and 
truly tracking where products come from is difficult in an ever globalizing world. For some, this 
creates a drive towards domestically produced products, as there is an expectation that goods 
produced in the United States are held to higher standards and contribute to job growth at home. 
What many individuals fail to account for in this ethical comparison is the substantial amount of 
prison labor used in the production of domestic goods.  
 The United States is five percent of the global population, yet holds nearly twenty percent 
of the world’s prison population, meaning that one in five incarcerated individuals in the world 
are in the United States.1 There are 2.2 million individuals currently incarcerated, representing a 
near doubling since the 1990s and a quadrupling since the 1980s, largely as a result of the war on 
drugs.2 Ten percent of these inmates are incarcerated in private prisons, or prisons that are 
independently owned and operated and who contract with the United States federal and state 
governments.3 The United States largely expanded into privately contracted prison labor around 
the same time incarceration was increasing and private prisons were first being introduced.4 
                                                     
1 Davis, Angela. Are Prisons Obsolete? New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003: 11.  
2 Quigley, William. “Prison Work, Wages, and Catholic Social Thought: Justin Demands Decent Work for 
Decent Wages, Even for Prisoners”, Santa Clara Law Review. 2004: 1159.  
3 Aman, Alfred & Greenhouse, Carol. “Prison Privatization and Inmate labor in the Global Economy: 
Reframing the Debate over Private Prisons”, Maurer School of Law: Indiana University, 2015: 382.  
4 Kang, Susan. “Forcing Prison Labor: International Labor Standards, Human Rights and the Privatization 
of Prison Labor in the Contemporary United States”,  John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New Political Science, 
2009: 155.  
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Incarceration at such a large scale was expensive, and inmate labor and private prisons were 
considered ways that the government could offset increasing costs.5  
 The effects of this expansion was the advent of the prison industrial complex, a system of 
private actors who systematically were able to profit off of the existence of private prisons 
themselves as well as the contracted labor incarcerated individuals performed.6 As a result, 
prisoners have been tasked with producing goods and services for a myriad of private companies 
including AT&T, Boeing, Revlon, Starbucks, Eddie Bauer, Target, McDonalds, Microsoft, 
Nordstrom, Kmart, JC Penny, Toys ‘R’ Us and many more companies.7 Many U.S. individuals 
have likely purchased goods made by prisoners, have talked on the phone with call centers 
staffed by prisoners, or have eaten produce prisoners have grown completely unknowingly.8 
What is the most troubling is that this labor is largely unregulated and unpaid or underpaid. 
Inmates generally receive substantially less than minimum wage for a day’s labor, and some of 
that money may be withheld by the state in order to cover incarceration costs, meaning in some 
cases incarcerated individuals may make less than $1 an hour for their labor.9 There are also 
fairly low if any regulations within private prisons, with few hourly maximums, no sick or other 
time off, no workplace safety federal oversight, and the potential for loss of privileges such as 
visitation rights if prisoners refuse to work. In some states, prisoners who refuse to work can 
even face solitary confinement as a punishment.10 
 Private prison labor’s general lack of regulation as well as the remarkably low wages 
prisoners are paid make it very easy to exploit. Minimum wage, forty hour weeks, full benefits 
                                                     
5 Ibid.  
6 Davis, Angela. Are Prisons Obsolete? New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003: 12.  
7 Young, Cynthia. “Punishing Labor: Why Labor Should Oppose the Prison Industrial Complex”, New 
Labor Forum, 2000: 4-6.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid.  
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packages, overtime, and the costs of maintaining work sites are all non-existent when a private 
company chooses to contract with prison labor instead.11 This necessarily makes prison labor the 
logical choice for many companies looking to cut labor costs in an ever globalizing world. 
Menial labor pushed on to prisoner’s being paid low wages as opposed to workers that are not 
incarcerated and making minimum wage substantially shift job markets and jobs away from 
those low wage workers. For example, once Victoria’s secret can shift sewing jobs out of 
minimum wage paying factories and into private prisons, they are able to produce substantially 
more for much less with the added bonus of not having to do nearly as much due diligence on 
workplace safety regulations, provide benefits, or even supervise labor in many instances. At the 
same time, US corporations who choose to use private prison labor domestically get the benefit 
of sales increases from being able to say “made in the USA” as well as breaks in transportation 
costs and fees for bringing products made abroad back to the United States to assemble, package 
or sell. 
 Furthermore, this labor, in many ways is self-propagating. The prison will replicate itself 
as long as it is profitable. Private prisons save the United States substantial amounts of money 
housing and feeding incarcerated individuals.12 America is constructing new prisons at 
substantial rate, because they are no longer just a function of the state to dissuade crime and to 
protect the public: they are a business, and a profitable one at that. What is really at stake here is 
the propagation and profiting of prisons at the expense of low wage workers. This paper will 
argue that private prisons and companies alike are able to utilize prison labor for economic and 
political benefit, causing increases in labor precarity for non-incarcerated low wage American 
workers. 
                                                     
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid.  
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A Review of the Literature 
This literature review is a broad discussion of the current state of prison labor in private 
institutions, an analysis of wage precarity and insecurity in the United States, and a legal analysis 
of the International Labor Organization’s Convention on Forced Labour. There have not been 
many substantive studies involving all three subfields, however they are all intrinsically related. 
Prison labor in private institutions is not only prohibited by international law, but prohibited 
specifically because of its potential effects on the free market. Many scholars believe that prison 
labor contributes to wage precarity as incarcerated individuals work for inadequate wages that 
allow private corporations to potentially monopolize markets. Essentially, when corporations are 
able to pay incarcerated workers less than minimum wage, it creates unfair competition for non-
incarcerated lower waged labor forces. This literature review is an exploration of the ways in 
which these three fields are interrelated in order to better explicate the ways prison labor may 
contribute to labor precarity.  
Private Prison Labor in the United States 
 The modern state of private prison labor in the United States is substantial, at times 
harmful, and has been justified throughout American history in a myriad of different ways. 
Private prisons can be defined as “for profit businesses that build and/or manage prisons for 
local, state, and federal governments.13” The majority of inmates housed in modern private 
prisons are managed by two corporations, the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and 
the GEO Group. These prisons operate either on a contract basis by managing existing public 
facilities, or through independent facilities built, managed, and run by the private entities 
themselves.14  They house thousands of inmates combined, with the most recent Department of 
                                                     
13 Selman, Donna & Leighton, Paul. Punishment For Sale 2010.  
14 Ibid.  
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Justice data suggesting that 130,941 inmates were being held in private prisons in 2011, an 
increase of nearly double over the ten years the data was taken.15 Data also suggests that private 
prisons are highly profitable, with annual revenues of the two corporations in 2010 surpassing 
$2.9 billion.16 This increase in population over time is of particular relevance, especially when 
considering the profit motive these private corporations likely have. The first section of the 
literature review explores the historical and modern justifications for private prisons, creating an 
understanding of their prevalence throughout American history, as well as analyze the ways in 
which wages, treatment, and standards are maintained within private prisons.  
Public to Private Prison Labour- The Historical Perspective  
 Throughout American history, there has been much consensus among academics that 
there is some benefit to prison labor. William Quigley (2004) argues that there are “moral, just, 
family, and practical reasons to offer work opportunities [to prisoners].” 17 He notes that in the 
1800s that many thought labor in prisons was beneficial because it taught prisoners life skills and 
could have some reformatory benefit—a sentiment that continues to this day.18 However, 
Quigley argues that prison privatization had some effect on these attitudes. He writes: “Within a 
few decades, however, the motive to make money emerged as the primary goal of prison labor 
and the privatization systems of contract convict labor and convict leasing became the dominant 
models...”19 It became clear that public awareness about how private models of prisons had 
disadvantages distinct from public institutions was on the rise. Cox and Meiners (2001) argue 
                                                     
15 Milman-Sivan, Faina. “Prisoners For Hire Towards a Normative Justification of the ILO’s Prohibition of 
Private Forced Prisoner Labor”, University of Haifa, Fordham International Law Journal, 2013: 1619-1681. 
16 Ibid.  
17 Quigley, William. “Prison Work, Wages, and Catholic Social Thought: Justin Demands Decent Work for 
Decent Wages, Even for Prisoners”, Santa Clara Law Review. 2004:1162.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid.  
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that as it became apparent that private prisons were profit driven, opposition grew in the form of 
businesses and trade unions.20 Quigley furthers this argument, writing that competition with low 
wage labor, as well as heightened manufacturing costs were key concerns for business owners.21 
One weakness of both pieces is that they fail to discuss at length the human costs of these 
privatized labor policies at any length. Undoubtedly there are consequences for incarcerated 
individuals in private prisons as there are often no regulations of conditions, and they are subject 
to being leased out to other private corporations for labor.22 Cox and Meiners do briefly mention 
that convict labor was often wrought with “cruel treatment,” and later in the piece discuss 
modern wage discrepancies among prisoners. Quigley continues that disapproval from 
businesses and trade unions ultimately led to the decline of private prison labor as laws were 
passed to prevent the interstate travel of goods produced by prisoners working for private firms. 
He notes, however that along with the re-emergence and substantial growth of private prisons in 
the 1980s (due in large part to the war on drugs substantially increasing prison populations) came 
the Prison Industry Enhancement Act, which allowed private firms to resume contract work with 
prisoners and ship goods across the country.23 It would seem that the historical justifications for 
prison labor—both private and public—were substantial enough to overcome potential concerns, 
and ultimately change policy within the United States over time.  
Modern Justifications for Private Prison Labour 
 Today there are several justifications for the modern adoption of private prisons and the 
labor that occurs within their walls. According to Donna Selman and Paul Leighton, in the 1980s 
                                                     
20 Cox, Charles & Meiners, Roger. “Private Employment of Prison Labor”, Journal of Private Enterprise, 
2001.  
21 Quigley, William. “Prison Work, Wages, and Catholic Social Thought: Justin Demands Decent Work for 
Decent Wages, Even for Prisoners”, Santa Clara Law Review. 2004: 1162 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid.  
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and 90s there was substantial pressure on politicians from both private enterprises and the public 
to adopt stances that were both tough on crime and less reliant on government.24 Consequently, 
this period of time led to substantial growth in the incarcerated prison population.25 Alfred Aman 
and Carol Greenhouse concur that tough on crime attitudes are what lead to prison overcrowding 
during the 90s due to heightened penalties for non-violent drug offenders.26 Selman and Leighton 
build on this line of reasoning, writing: “their solution, privatization, fit with the attack on the 
government’s handling of public service, the fervent belief in the power of free markets, and the 
dominant discourse suggesting that more incarceration was the only answer to the crime 
problem.”27 Overcrowding, demand for less government involvement in all aspects, and tough on 
crime attitudes have all been conceptualized as justifications for the re-emergence and growth of 
the private prison industry.  
 Another justification for both private prisons and their labor is that it is simply cheaper 
than public prisons. Quigley notes that this is a common rationale for the adoption of private 
prisons, with several authors making the claim that public institutions are simply less efficient.28 
However, several studies have indicated that the justification of efficiency is not sufficient: “a 
2001 report under the auspices of the Bureau of Justice Assistance indicate that the cost 
differential between private and public prisons is minimal.”29 Camp and Gaes posit that in cases 
where costs prove to be minimal, savings may not come from the efficacy of the private 
                                                     
24 Selman, Donna & Leighton, Paul. Punishment For Sale 2010: 56.  
25 Camp, Scott & Gaes, Gerald. “Growth and Quality of U.S Private Prisons: Evidence from a National 
Survey”, Federal Bureau of Prisons Office of Research and Evaluation, 2001. 
26 Aman, Alfred & Greenhouse, Carol. “Prison Privatization and Inmate labor in the Global Economy: 
Reframing the Debate over Private Prisons”, Maurer School of Law: Indiana University, 2015: 378.  
27 Selman, Donna & Leighton, Paul. Punishment For Sale 2010: 56. 
28 Quigley, William. “Prison Work, Wages, and Catholic Social Thought: Justin Demands Decent Work for 
Decent Wages, Even for Prisoners”, Santa Clara Law Review. 2004: 1162.  
29 Aman, Alfred & Greenhouse, Carol. “Prison Privatization and Inmate labor in the Global Economy: 
Reframing the Debate over Private Prisons”, Maurer School of Law: Indiana University, 2015: 374. 
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institutions themselves, but rather the savings they get from paying lower wages (both to inmates 
and guards), fewer staff, cheaper food, and many more factors.30 Both of these examples serve to 
disprove the common narrative posited by Quigley.  
Inmate Wages, Rights, and Standards Within Private Prisons 
 Prisoners definitionally do not have substantial rights while incarcerated. However there 
are some ways which private prisons undermine these rights substantially more than public 
institutions. Prisoners are generally required to work and often do so both with or without pay.31 
Quigley argues that the Fair Labor Standards Act, which requires workers be paid a minimum 
wage in the United States, is “silent as to the coverage of prison labor,” and that “prisoners have 
no constitutional right to be paid at all for the work they are forced to perform.”32 However, the 
matter of coverage under the act is contested when it comes to privately operated or contracted 
facilities.33 Private prison inmates are not protected in any capacity as the Fair Labor Standards 
Act does not contest how private employers manage inmate employees.34 One weakness of the 
piece, however, is that the justification for how private and public prisoners are treated 
differently under the Act are not substantially well developed. Atman and Greenhouse explain 
that discrepancies in wages and conditions exist between private and public prisons: 
“...government and private companies are held to different accountabilities and rationales; they 
are also subject to different formulations of success.”35 For these reasons, Dolovich argues that 
                                                     
30 Camp, Scott & Gaes, Gerald. “Growth and Quality of U.S Private Prisons: Evidence from a National 
Survey”, Federal Bureau of Prisons Office of Research and Evaluation, 2001: 2.  
31 Quigley, William. “Prison Work, Wages, and Catholic Social Thought: Justin Demands Decent Work for 
Decent Wages, Even for Prisoners”, Santa Clara Law Review. 2004: 1165-67.   
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid.  
35 Aman, Alfred & Greenhouse, Carol. “Prison Privatization and Inmate labor in the Global Economy: 
Reframing the Debate over Private Prisons”, Maurer School of Law: Indiana University, 2015: 404.  
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outcomes of treatment also differ between the two.36 He further contends that guard training, 
standards imposed, and inadequate investments are all factors in the different ways prisoner 
outcomes might differ and potentially be worse for private company inmates.37 Cynthia Young 
furthers Dolovich’s argument, noting that private prison labor operates outside of US 
employment standards that have been fought for:  
Prisoners cannot quit, call in sick, leave early, take vacation time, or earn a pension. They 
are also exempt from daily work-hour maximums, so they often must work as long as the 
employer wants. Refusal to work is punished by the revoking of privileges such as visits 
from or calls to family members and access to the prison store. In California, if inmates 
decline to work, they can even be moved to solitary confinement.38  
Her argument bolsters that of Atman & Greenhouse who write that standards that government 
institutions are held to are often ignored within the confines of private prisons.39 Occupational 
Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) regulations, fair wages, and adequate worker 
representation are difficult to find and rarely enforced within prisons in general, but to a 
substantially larger extent in private prisons themselves.40 The utter lack of regulations and the 
severity of working conditions are shocking, and essentially create a labor force unburdened by 
regulations that seek to reduce the potential harms of employment. 
                                                     
36 Dolovich, Sharon. “State Punishment and Private Prisons”, Duke Law Journal, 2005: 483.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Young, Cynthia. “Punishing Labor: Why Labor Should Oppose the Prison Industrial Complex”, New 
Labor Forum, 2000: 6.  
39 Aman, Alfred & Greenhouse, Carol. “Prison Privatization and Inmate labor in the Global Economy: 
Reframing the Debate over Private Prisons”, Maurer School of Law: Indiana University, 2015: 404.  
40 Young, Cynthia. “Punishing Labor: Why Labor Should Oppose the Prison Industrial Complex”, New 
Labor Forum, 2000: 4.  
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Precarious Employment & Prison Labor  
The link between precarious employment and the utilization of prison labor has been 
established to a limited extent in the literature, with authors arguing that prison labor has the 
potential to create adverse outcomes to non-incarcerated individuals in precarious job positions. 
Precarious labor is a somewhat ambiguous term, but which generally refers to the insecurity 
many low wage workers face in their day to day lives due to the threat of joblessness. Sharryn 
Kasmir defines precarity as denoting “a general, pervasive ontological condition of vulnerability, 
displacement, and insecurity…”41 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics nearly 21.6 
million employees work in precarious situations.42  
Kang argues that laborer precarity and prison labor are intrinsically linked due to the 
stresses that prison labor brings to the low wage market sphere.43 Kasmir concurs, writing 
“Today, forced, bonded, and imprisoned laborers provide services and produce consumer goods, 
while 1.6 million people live in multidimensional poverty…”44 Linus Nilsson also agrees with 
this logic, citing the ways in which private prison companies can take advantage of the free 
market through cheap labor:  “…protects free workers market, and, if the prison produces goods 
for sale on the open market, there is a problem with unfair competition. Businesses that comply 
with fair conditions and standards at work cannot compete with prisons which do not pay for 
their prisoner’s work.”45 As Cynthia Young argues, “why should corporations pay union-scale or 
                                                     
41 Kasmir, Sharryn. “Precarity”, Cambridge Encyclopedia of Anthropology, 2019.  
42 Moody, Kim. “The State of American Labor.” Jacobin. 2016. 
43 Kang, Susan. “Forcing Prison Labor: International Labor Standards, Human Rights and the Privatization 
of Prison Labor in the Contemporary United States”,  John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New Political Science, 
2009. 
44 Kasmir, Sharryn. “Precarity”, Cambridge Encyclopedia of Anthropology, 2019 
45 Nilsson, Linus. “Abandon All Labour Rights, Ye Who Enter Here: The Labour Rights of Prisoners”, 
Lund University, 2017. 
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living wages when they can pay pennies a day to inmates behind bars?”46 She expands on 
Nilsson’s argument about working conditions by extrapolating that these conditions contribute to 
corporate preferentialism. The lack of labor unions, limited hour work weeks, arbitration, OSHA 
standards, and general benefits make prison labor substantially more attractive to companies 
needing to source low wage unskilled jobs.47 According to economist Gordon Lafer, this is 
because the very metric of a private prison relies on operating facilities for “less than what the 
state pays them” and then, to turn a profit, “contract prisoners out to private enterprises” for low 
wages.48 Many argue that this discrepancy in wages is the driving factor behind prison labor’s 
impact on wage precarity in the United States. As one article argues, “...low wage prisoners 
undermine competitive unskilled and semi-skilled labor markets and decrease living standards of 
those who remain employed by reducing wage rates. Unskilled or semi-skilled laborers would be 
the most at risk since most prison jobs are unskilled or semi-skilled.”49 In other words, if 
unskilled and semi-skilled prisoners are able to do the same jobs for the same companies for 
lower wages than non-incarcerated individuals, those non-incarcerated individuals are likely to 
lose their jobs.50 Ultimately what this line of argumentation serves to prove from these authors is 
that first, there is a precarious working class facing joblessness on an everyday basis; that prison 
labor’s draw to private industry via low wages, to some extent contributes to precarity. 
 
                                                     
46 Young, Cynthia. “Punishing Labor: Why Labor Should Oppose the Prison Industrial Complex”, New 
Labor Forum, 2000: 2.  
47 Ibid.  
48 Lafer, Gordon. “Captive Labor: America’s Prisoners as Corporate Workforce” American Prospect, 1999: 67.  
49 Derrick, Frederick et. al. “Prison Labor Effects on the Unskilled Labor Market”, American Economist, 
2004: 76.  
50 Ibid.  
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Issues of International Legality of Private Prisons 
 International law surrounding the regulation of prison labor, and by extension prisoner 
rights, is not substantially well developed. The primary international regulation surrounding 
prison labor is the International Labor Organization Forced Labour Convention No. 29, which 
was ratified in 1930 and explicates what types of labor qualify as forced or coerced. The 
International Labor Organization (ILO) defines forced labour as “all work or service which is 
exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not 
offered himself voluntarily.”51 Upon first glance the convention implies that prison labor, which 
is often compulsory, qualifies as forced, and is therefore illegal labor.52 However, as Linus 
Nilsson argues, prisoners are exempt from this definition as a later article within the convention 
explicitly excludes prisoners and their labor from normative definitions of forced labor itself.53 
Article two, section C explicates that prison labor is one condition that is exempt from being 
considered forced labor:  
Any work or service exacted from any person as a consequence of a conviction in a court 
of law, provided that the said work or service is carried out under the supervision and 
control of a public authority and that the said person is not hired to or placed at the 
disposal of private individuals, companies or associations[...].54  
Most relevantly, this article makes the distinction between private and public forms of prison 
labor and dictates that prisoners must carry out work under the “supervision and control” of a 
public authority.55 Private prisons, and the labor that occurs within their walls are therefore 
                                                     
51 Nilsson, Linus. “Abandon All Labour Rights, Ye Who Enter Here: The Labour Rights of Prisoners”, 
Lund University, 2017. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid.  
54 International Labour Organization. “ILO Forced Labour Convention Number 29”, 1930. 
55 Ibid.  
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necessarily in violation of ILO standards, as well as those public prisons that have labor 
arrangements with private corporations.56  
Textual Analysis of Convention 29 
 The nature of the International Labor Organization Convention on Forced Labour 
indicates that there are significant constraints on private prisons and private enterprise within 
prisons. These constraints mean that several states, including the United States, Australia, the 
United Kingdom and many more are arguably in violation of international law. Susan Kang 
writes: “The United States’ domestic policies not only contradict its foreign policies, but also 
violate is international legal obligations. Specifically, they violate the International Labor 
Organization’s Convention on the elimination of forced labor.”57 Also demonstrative of this 
argument, Swepston argues is that America has failed to ratify convention 29, making it only one 
of nine countries to do so.58 The lack of compliance on the part of states, and more specifically 
the United States, is not substantially contested by most authors. However, attempts at 
understanding the nature of  violations are very present in the literature.  
 Convention 29 itself has undergone significant textual scrutiny with committees being 
formed by the ILO over the years to establish what the best and most relevant interpretation of 
the language of the convention is.59 However, many authors have slightly different 
understandings of what the agreement actually says. Though “private enterprise” is fleshed out in 
the convention as “private individuals, companies, or associations,” there is some dispute over 
what the language actually means. Nilsson argues that private prisons are included in definitions 
                                                     
56 Kang, Susan. “Forcing Prison Labor: International Labor Standards, Human Rights and the Privatization 
of Prison Labor in the Contemporary United States”,  John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New Political Science, 
2009: 139.  
57 Ibid.  
58 Swepston, Lee. “Prison Labour and International Human Rights.” 2001. 
59 Ibid.  
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of private enterprises and therefore “the supervision and control of a public authority also proves 
to be problematic for privately owned prisons, since they are, by pure definition, not public.”60 
What can be agreed upon is that the convention accomplishes two things in its language: it 
creates a “distinction between private and public,” and “affords better protection to prisoners 
working for private enterprise.”61  
Justifications for the ILO Forced Labour Convention  
 The International Labor Organization faced difficulties when determining which forms of 
prison labor to classify as forced. Kang argues that the normative justifications for prison labor 
(such as labors rehabilitative effects and potential recidivism rate reductions) are what ultimately 
persuaded the Organization to only prohibit explicitly private uses of prison labor.62 The ILO did 
not fundamentally disagree that prison labor could be useful, both to states and to incarcerated 
individuals.63 Though that is not to say that there was not substantial concern over the potential 
consequences of allowing prison labor to be propagated by figures that were not the state.64 
Milman-Sivan conceptualizes the justifications for Convention 29 as two separate schools of 
thought: one being abuse of power arguments, the other being market based arguments. Abuse of 
power arguments have to do with the potential for exploitation of prisoners as there is a tendency 
for private actors to be profit seeking, rather than concerned about the well-being of prisoners in 
                                                     
60 Nilsson, Linus. “Abandon All Labour Rights, Ye Who Enter Here: The Labour Rights of Prisoners”, 
Lund University, 2017.  
61 Milman-Sivan, Faina. “Prisoners For Hire Towards a Normative Justification of the ILO’s Prohibition of 
Private Forced Prisoner Labor”, University of Haifa, Fordham International Law Journal, 2013: 1619-1681. 
62 Kang, Susan. “Forcing Prison Labor: International Labor Standards, Human Rights and the Privatization 
of Prison Labor in the Contemporary United States”,  John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New Political Science, 
2009. 
63 Nilsson, Linus. “Abandon All Labour Rights, Ye Who Enter Here: The Labour Rights of Prisoners”, 
Lund University, 2017. 
64 Milman-Sivan, Faina. “Prisoners For Hire Towards a Normative Justification of the ILO’s Prohibition of 
Private Forced Prisoner Labor”, University of Haifa, Fordham International Law Journal, 2013: 1629. 
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their care.65 Kang furthers this argument, indicating that instead of saving the state money, 
private companies simply absorb profits gained through cheaper inmate labor.66  
 Unlike Kang, Milman-Sivan believes that the standard abuse of power justification is 
ideologically weak, and often becomes a reduction to a type of moral shaming; profits will be 
sought after, regardless of private or public affiliation.67 She cites market pressures as a 
secondary set of justifications, calling it the “competition rationale.” Her argument essentially 
states that private prison labor can contaminate the already public market that exists, therefore 
making the potential for exploitation of the private prisoners an attractive idea.68 Nilsson expands 
on this idea, stating that the convention “…protects free workers market, and, if the prison 
produces goods for sale on the open market, there is a problem with unfair competition. 
Businesses that comply with fair conditions and standards at work cannot compete with prisons 
which do not pay the same for their prisoner’s work.”69 Kang seems to confer that this argument 
is relevant, particularly on an international scale. She argues that a sort of “race to the bottom” 
where states continuously lower wages to remain competitive, could be detrimental to the global 
economy and to the rights of all workers beyond prisoners.70 In 1998, an ILO Conference 
Committee discussing the ways in which Convention 29 standards should be applied seemed to 
agree that there was a risk of Kang’s proposed race to the bottom. They argued that it was 
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apparent that private prisons and companies could exploit prison labor through paying prisoners 
wages far below the federal minimum.71 Kang’s work agrees with these ILO findings; she argues 
that violation of Convention 29 has direct impacts on both domestic and international economies. 
She writes that in the United States “the use of prison labor directly threatens job security, 
wages, conditions, and the strength of unions.”72 Kang argues that justifications for this claim are 
two-fold. First, international pressures through a normalized use of private prison labor drive all 
wages down internationally. This same effect is then replicated domestically in the United States. 
As deindustrialization has occurred and forced jobs abroad, “private actors’ access to prison 
labor grants these companies access to a low-wage, disciplined labor force without the added 
costs of overseas production.”73 This implies that beyond the pressures American labor faces 
from offshoring, those remaining low wage, unskilled jobs are then filled by prisoners due to the 
low wages corporations facing global pressures can get away with paying them.74 Her 
argumentation is key as it frames wage precarity in the United States and abroad as intrinsically 
linked to the increase of private prison labor in Western states.   
Enforcement 
 Given arguments such as Kang’s that indicate the United States and potentially other 
actors are in violation of Convention 29, many authors have attempted to understand why there 
have been no consequences. Much debate boils down to a question as to the efficacy of the 
enforcement mechanisms that the International Labor Organization possesses. Kang writes that 
the ILO “does not have strong enforcement mechanisms,” and that there are no potential 
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ramifications that serve as deterrents to state actions.75 Nilsson explains that the process of 
enforcement involves states filing reports against one another, and those reports being brought to 
the ILO. If there is no action taken at that point, the case goes to the International Court of 
Justice for a ruling.76 Although, he notes that this rarely occurs due to a lack of reports being 
followed, and due to state’s willingness to at least appear to acquiesce to the ILO.77 
Extrapolating from the literature base it is therefore understandable that there have been few 
ramifications for state’s failure to be held responsible for potentially violating international law.  
Conclusions 
 The main findings of this review are that there are definite connections between private 
prisons, wage precarity, and matters of international legality. The solidification of causal links 
between wage precarity and specifically private prison labor, comprehensive data on the extent 
and scope of prison labor after 2012, and data on prison labor’s impact are all lacking in the 
current literature base. Further work could help to answer the questions posited by this paper 
more comprehensively, however the information provided has allowed this literature review to 
solidify its findings. It finds that there is relative consensus that private prison labor creates 
unfair competition with laborers in the free market, as the low wages prisoners receive 
necessarily corner markets. Additionally, it finds that conditions have the potential to be worse in 
private institutions due to a myriad of factors. The third section on international legality heavily 
suggests that the United States, among other states, may be in violation of international law. 
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Case Studies  
In researching worker precarity’s connection to private prison labor, it became apparent 
that there had been very little data collected connecting the two in meaningful ways. Widespread 
data about offshoring and immigration’s effects on labor in the United States were substantially 
better developed, likely due to the normalization of those narratives as threats to jobs and the free 
market. Substantive studies abroad, in other countries that also utilize private prison labor (New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada mainly) were also difficult to come by, and it 
seemed as though private prison labor in those countries was less normalized than in the United 
States.78 Comprehensive, national data was also not available in the context of the United States, 
however, the existence of state level prisons yielded far more independent cases of prison labor 
being documented as detrimental to non-incarcerated laborers.  
There seemed to be only one empirical national level study of incarcerated labor’s effects 
on the free market. Its methodology was to use a previous study on immigration’s logarithmic 
equations, factoring in specific elasticities associated with prison labor. This methodology, 
however, seemed suspect to me as there is little analysis or explanation as to why the authors feel 
immigration is comparable enough to prison labor to use the same equations to study both. This 
study found that prison labor did actually reduce employment levels, finding that “the 85,432 
prisoners currently employed reduce free employment by between 33,503 and 51,254 jobs...”79 
This seemingly confirms the hypothesis that prison labor contributes to labor precarity, however, 
the authors of this study conclude that the market shock from prison labor is not substantially 
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different from other shocks the market has already faced.80 Even in this case, which has 
methodology that seems to be questionable, and is the only aggregate study, the empirical data 
would seem to bolster the idea that job loss and precarity are caused to some degree by private 
prison labor. This is significant because even if the author’s conclusions do not support the idea 
that prison labor produces unique effects, their data would seem at a basal level to back this idea.  
Case studies would seem to give substantially more insight into the ways prison labor 
directly contributes to worker precarity, as there are dozens of examples of this link as opposed 
to a singular empirical analysis. Qualitative analysis through a series of case studies should give 
a more comprehensive idea of the scope of prison labor. Even if that scope is limited, as the 
above study indicates it may be, it allows for a better understanding of the specific conditions 
which lead to worker insecurity after private entities contract with prison labor. Knowing that 
between 30 and 50 thousand jobs were lost during the period Derrick’s study analyzed is 
important, however, understanding how those job losses occurred is important as well.81 The 
case studies chosen here are two of numerous qualitative examples, however these were chosen 
particularly for the quality of their documentation. Each of the two main case studies analyzed 
here have been through legal proceedings regarding claims of infringement on the free market 
and workers’ rights. Due to a lack of financial or legal resources, many of these cases, 
particularly smaller ones, are not well documented and lack substantive data on their own, often 
coming from very small news outlet stories. Therefore, in addition to the two case studies, an 
analysis of smaller cases taken in conjunction with one another will be analyzed. These case 
studies and their subsequent analysis should provide some degree of understanding of how wage 
precarity and prison labor are more concretely interconnected.  
                                                     
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid.  
  
 24 
Tennessee: Tennier Industries  
One of few well documented cases of private sector jobs being lost to prison labor is the 
case of Tennier Industries, a Tennessee based clothing production company. Their contract was 
initially with the Department of Defense to produce $45 million worth of textiles. However, they 
ultimately lost their long held contract to the Federal Prison Industries (FPI) (a subsidiary of 
UNICOR), a government owned corporation that works to contract prisoner’s labor.82 FPI was 
able to quote higher production yields for lower costs as a result of the wages they were paying 
their incarcerated employees. The average prisoner on this project was making between $0.23 
and $1.15 per hour of labor compared to the federally mandated minimum wage of $7.25.83 After 
losing their contract, Tennier had to lay off over 100 workers; 100 individuals who otherwise 
would have had full time employment.84  
Tennier filed a protest with the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) arguing 
that the DOD violated a provision designed to allow small businesses in Historically 
Underutilized Business Zones (HUBZone) to better compete for government contracts.85 This 
provision in theory allows for economic development in areas that have not historically been 
strong business centers, and to reward small businesses for starting up in areas that need 
economic stimulus.86 Tennier was one such small business.87 The GAO ultimately decided that 
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the Federal Prison Industries were not required to adhere to HUBZone requirements and that no 
statutes had been violated by FPI acquiring the contract.88 The GAO writes:  
The agency received 9 proposals, including Tennier’s and FPI’s […] According to the 
protester, allowing FPI to compete defeats the purpose of the Historically Underutilized 
Business (HUBZone) Act of 1997 […] we conclude that DLA’s decision to permit FPI to 
compete under the solicitation did not violate a procurement statute or regulation.89  
Essentially, this decision is indicative of a much larger problem as it pertains to the legality of 
competition. Government agencies are allowed to offer contracts to the lowest bidder (generally 
FPI) as long as items acquired are comparable in “price, quality, and time of delivery.”90 
However, the moment that they are not comparable in only one of those areas, agencies are 
required to implement “fair opportunity” in competing contracts, thereby allowing the lowest 
bidder to take the contract as long as the items produced are of comparable quality and time of 
production and delivery.91 This particularity is what causes the most difficulties for companies 
trying to compete with FPI. If prisoners are allowed to be paid substantially lower than minimum 
wage for the same amount of labor, they are able to produce goods for FPI that are of the same 
quality and time to produce, but are substantially cheaper.92 This disallows private sector 
competition from the very start. It is even more difficult when government agencies are 
“encouraged to purchase FPI supplies and services to the maximum extent practicable.”93  
Ultimately, this occurs in dozens of cases where various government agencies are able to bypass 
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contracting assistance policies designed to encourage economic growth. Instead, they focus 
inwards on a pseudo public corporation that uses prison labor to minimize cost and ultimately to 
make a profit.94 Furthermore, FPI itself actively acknowledges this truth, writing that they must 
function as a business and make profits in order to sustain operations and to expand them to new 
customers.95 They do however, fail to acknowledge the effects that profit seeking may have on 
private sector employment. Tennier’s CFO, Steven Eisen, summarizes the frustrations his and 
other private companies feel towards having to compete with FPI and other prisoner contracting 
programs: “Our government screams, howls and yells how the rest of the world is using 
prisoners or slave labor to manufacture items, and here we take the items right out of the mouths 
of people who need it.”96 This case study ultimately creates some degree of understanding that 
there are consequences to low wage laborers when prison labor is at play. Even in this example, 
which demonstrates a public agency (the Department of Defense) seeking a contract in 
circumstances were FPI has already been given preferential treatment in other deals, the cost 
discrepancy in production and other factors was insurmountable for private laborers to be able to 
adequately compete.97 
Washington State: Microjet and Talon Industries  
An additional well-documented case is that of Microjet and Talon Industries in 
Washington state. Microjet Industries (a water jet cutting business) was able to contract with 
Washington Correctional Facilities and ultimately gained “free access to a 56,000 square foot 
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industrial space, built specifically for private prison industries.”98 Being the only water jet 
company that had such a contract, Microjet was able to create somewhat of a monopoly, earning 
many of the contracts previously held by other companies.99 Talon industries was one such 
competitor company affected, and it eventually had to close down operations.100 Rick Trelstad, 
the owner of Talon Industries said, “his company shut down in 1999 at least in part because 
Microjet consistently underbid him for work.”101  
In 2004, Talon Industries, along with other waterjet companies based in Washington state 
decided to sue Washington State Correctional facilities: “They argued that Microjet’s free use of 
a correctional facility’s space and access to cheap labor had given the company an unfair 
advantage.”102 The court ultimately decided to rule in favor of the waterjet association, arguing 
that the advertisement of “lower labor and overhead costs” created an unfair burden on other 
companies to compete effectively.103 The court cited three arguments that the founders of 
Washington State had originally made against private prison labor: “...fears over the unfair 
competition to free labor, the conditions of brutality for inmates, and the possible corruption and 
favoritism [towards certain private interests] associated with private convict labor.”104 This was a 
highly significant court decision which decided that private contracting within prisons in this 
manner was unconstitutional state wide.105 However, public reactions to this ruling were highly 
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negative, mostly due to state prison chief Joe Lehman’s public statements about loss of state 
revenues: “He estimated an annual loss of $600,000 for covering incarceration costs for the 
inmates, and a loss of up to $150,000 for victims’ funds.”106 The accuracy of these figures is not 
widely known, and some authors, including Susan Kang, believe them to be “garnished” in some 
way, likely from comparing worker wages to those of non-incarcerated workers.107 Nevertheless, 
the fear of such significant financial losses to tax payers was enough for the public to vote the 
private use of prison labor into a constitutional amendment through a ballot initiative in 2007.108 
As Susan Kang argues, this vote demonstrated that the public, politicians, and private interests 
valued profits and “punishment over protecting vulnerable workers.”109  
Texas, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Beyond 
 There are numerous examples that are not documented well enough to stand on their 
own, only to be found in one paragraph descriptions in news articles and other popular sources. 
These are not highly verified, and generally stem from the testimony of one or two individuals 
impacted by a company’s prison labor contracting. These are examples that do not have easily 
accessible court or agency proceedings, or whose effects never resulted in legal consequences. It 
can be extrapolated from Gordon Lafer’s work on wage precarity that in many cases individuals 
or small companies simply do not have the resources to file official complaints against job and 
contract losses.110 These case studies on their own do not yield substantive qualitative data from 
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which one could extrapolate an argument, however, combined they do make a compelling case 
for the scale of worker displacement from prison labor across the United States.  
 One of the more popularized in media cases is that of Boeing Corporation in Washington 
State. Boeing is no stranger to labor controversy, and its prison labor controversy in the late 90s 
is no different. In an effort to save costs, Boeing relocated two Seattle factories: one to China and 
one to the Washington State Reformatory.111 According to one author, conditions were not 
terribly different in the two new factories:  
Employees live right next to the factory premises. They are forbidden to form any type of 
trade union, much less an independent one. For those who step out of line on the shop 
floors of Washington prisons, there is the notorious Intensive Management Unit of 
‘reeducation through sensory deprivation’ fame112  
Ultimately, this case demonstrates that factories are not unlike forced labor that many Americans 
often criticize: workers are stripped of association rights, forced to act in strict and particular 
ways, and must live near their places of work until they become all consumed by the labor they 
perform. Furthermore, individuals are punished in cruel ways such as solitary confinement for 
any misstep or failure to perform, likening this instance of prison labor to examples Americans 
often construct as purely an overseas phenomenon. Beyond this, the shuttering of two factories 
only to have one be relocated in China demonstrates that similarly to offshoring, companies do 
seek increased profit margins by outsourcing labor to areas where they can pay lower wages and 
provide less benefits.113  
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 Another example is that of Lockhart Technologies in Austin, Texas. Upon contracting 
with Lockhart Correctional Facilities, the company decided to close its plant in Austin, laying off 
130 circuit board assembly workers.114 Lockhart Technologies made this decision after being 
presented with an offer to have inmates perform work in “a state-subsidized facility on prison 
grounds for which the company paid just one dollar in rent per year.”115 Lockhart additionally 
was able to pay inmates minimum wage (often less, realistically, after legalized restitution based 
wage skimming) and offer no benefits or workman’s compensation,  as opposed to the more than 
$10 an hour plus benefits those 130 non-incarcerated laborers were making previously.116  
 The state of Oregon is also wrought with hundreds of examples of prison labor detracting 
from free market labor. Much of this stems from Oregon’s mandatory prison labor law.117 This 
mandate from 1994 states that all prisoners should work 40 hour weeks, and encourages 
correctional facilities to market their labor force to private industries.118 As a result, many 
administrative public servant type jobs are now being filled by prisoners in Oregon state such as 
data entry and record keeping.119  However, this mandate has displaced numerous non-
incarcerated workers. In one study, it was found that one hundred construction workers lost their 
jobs when Umatilla prison decided to hire inmates instead.120 This is just one of many examples 
from after the law was adopted:  
...thousands of public sector jobs [had] been taken over by prisoners; workers in the 
private sector [had] been laid off when their firms lost contracts to prison based 
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industries; and with the cost of supervising a full-time work force, the state for the first 
time in its history [was] spending more on corrections than on higher education.121  
This scope of this mandate, unfortunately, has not been fully explored in aggregate studies, and 
the true extent of public and private sector job losses not confirmed. However, simply based on 
individual reporting and correctional spending increases as discussed above, one can get a pretty 
good picture of the extent of prison labor displacing jobs in the state of Oregon.  
 There are infinitely more small and lightly documented cases in existence across the 
country. The same author who discusses Lockhart and Boeing attempts to put the frequency of 
these cases into perspective:  
In recent years, an Ohio supplier of Honda automobile parts paid inmates two dollars per 
hour to perform the same work unionized free workers had done for twenty to thirty 
dollars per hour; an Arizona company closed its unionized slaughterhouse to open a 
prison operation at much lower cost; and in 1997, within one year of opening a 
production facility in a Wisconsin prison, the Fabry Glove and Mitten Company’s inmate 
workforce, paid $5.25 per hour, had grown to 100 while its “free labor force,” paid $11 
per hour, had shrunk from 205 to 120. Prison labor is not just a prisoner issue.122  
These wage discrepancies are significant, and can represent both great increases in profits for 
businesses, as well as huge job losses for non-incarcerated workers. Differences of up to $28 an 
hour as documented here can greatly increase production yields as well as profit margins. Even if 
non-incarcerated laborers are willing to work for minimum wage, prison labor still has a clear 
competitive advantage as state and federal mandated minimum wages for prisoners are small or 
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non-existent. This disadvantages low income workers who are not incarcerated and who have to 
make the federally mandated minimum wage; this was the case in a Georgia recycling plant 
where 50 employees were laid off after their company contracted prison labor.123 35 of the 50 
employees who were laid off had taken their current positions in order to get off of welfare, and 
many of them promptly had to go back on it after losing their jobs.124 The private sector is also 
acutely aware of the advantages contractors have when they work with prisoners instead of non-
incarcerated workers. In one case, Lizer Lawn Care in Wisconsin lost a $13,000 contract with the 
state to cut the lawn at the Sheriff’s Office.125 However, the owner of that company seemed to 
have some level of understanding for the state’s ending of his contract, saying: “Obviously we’d 
like the work, but I know just like any other business, if there’s a chance of saving money, it 
would be a smart business move.”126 The common doctrine of free market competition seems to 
have influenced this business owner’s belief, likely because he lost a contract, and not his 
business to prison labor. However, there is no doubt that for many private and public companies, 
contracting with prisoners is the cheaper, more logical solution as it saves money and allows for 
higher profit margins.  
Conclusions 
 These cases taken together, do not necessarily paint a picture of a wide sweeping 
pandemic of job loss in ways that narratives like offshoring or immigration do. However, the 
scale of these instances of worker precarity being exacerbated by prison labor is not small. Cases 
such as 20 up to even 100 workers losing their jobs, especially in areas that are already painted 
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as economically struggling, simply do not get the news coverage that massive relocations of 
huge industrial facilities overseas do. Consequently, this may be painted as a seemingly non-
issue, an effect that is potentially no different than other shocks to the free market such as baby 
boomers retiring as one author posits.127 However, there are real tangible effects, and prison 
labor has grown substantially, even in the times since these case studies occurred.128 These 
effects may not seem substantial in the aggregate, but in terms of increased profits from private 
prisons, and numbers of low wage employees who have lost their jobs, they are. These effects 
need to be studied in the aggregate, and eventually at a nation-wide level, but for now these case 
studies demonstrate well the mechanisms by which prison labor has contributed to precarity.  
Analysis: How Did We Get Here?  
 From case study analysis, it is clear that companies with the means are likely to use prison 
labor in order to cut costs, production time, and to compete more effectively. However, in many 
cases this decision to capitalize on prison labor is as a response to economic pressures. This 
pressure comes from an ever changing economic landscape with revenue losses and market 
volatility becoming ever more common. Simultaneously, incarceration rates continue to increase 
(albeit at a slower pace than in the 1980s and 90s) maintaining a large, captive, labor pool.129 In a 
world of prevalent offshoring and public pressure to keep jobs domestic and repatriate labor, 
prison labor is an opportunity for companies to politically and economically benefit.130 However, 
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this repatriation does not follow common narratives of giving Americans “back their jobs” and 
rather further entrenches the cyclical poverty many low wage non incarcerated workers face.  
Understanding How Private Prison Labor Promotes Itself Politically  
 In order to prescribe policy solutions to private prisons encroachment on the labor market, 
it is important to understand the ways in which private prison labor and the prison industrial 
complex as a whole has propagated itself over time. Politically, private prison labor has been 
able to bolster itself through the same mechanisms that bolster other means of government 
corruption: lobbying, large scale campaign contributions, revolving doors, purchased policy 
drafting, and a general lack of public awareness. In terms of lobbying, there is substantial 
evidence that corporations spend millions of dollars in order to lobby the government to advance 
policies and actions that decrease barriers to prison labor. The GEO Group and CoreCivic, two 
large private prison corporations, spent over five million dollars in 2016 alone lobbying the 
federal government.131 While these corporations say that they will not lobby for any laws or 
policies that would affect individuals and the conditions of their incarceration, they do lobby for 
longer sentences and increased government funding.132 Campaign contributions also play a big 
role, with one study identifying 3,100 corporations with private prison labor interests or 
connections donating over $175 million in state and federal elections in 2016.133 It is also 
important to note that the officials themselves receiving these campaign contributions may 
themselves be former corrections officials or have business experience in private prison 
corporations. There have been several instances of top corrections officials leaving their jobs at 
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GEO Group and then going to be in decision making positions at prisons or government 
administration positions pertaining to prison labor.134  
 However, one of the most insidious instances of political mechanisms being used to 
advance private prison labor instances is that of policy foundations being paid by private prison 
corporations to draft policies that are beneficial to the industry. One example is the policy group 
the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), which had investment connections to the 
Corrections Corporation of America and the American Bail Coalition when it drafted and 
lobbied for policy increasing sentencing severity and duration in dozens of states in the 1990s.135 
Collectively, these political mechanisms make it possible for private prison corporations to 
create widespread policy changes that benefit their companies and bottom lines. Individuals, 
especially those affected by the wage precarity these corporations, may be causing through their 
use of prison labor (as well as prisoners themselves) do not have the “political muscle” necessary 
in order to sway policy in a direction which may benefit them.136 Public opinion is also not on 
their side in order to help bolster their political fight, as there is a general shroud of secrecy over 
the use of prison labor. Supply chains, degree of use, and which politicians support and are 
financially backed by prison labor are all remarkably difficult to ascertain.137 This contributes to 
a lack of understanding of the problem, as well as a lack of any political will to stop the 
prevalence of private prison labor. This lack of public outrage prohibits any sort of collectivized 
national or international response to the issue as a whole.  
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Public Outrage, Ignorance, and Paths Forward 
 However, this lack of political power is not to say that there is no hope surrounding this 
issue. Many studies have shown that there is substantial concern over prison labor and 
incarceration in America in general across “all political parties, regions, age, gender, and 
racial/ethnic groups,” making it one of few instances where nearly everyone can agree on a 
political issue.138 Research also shows that some individuals are concerned over connections they 
see between mass incarceration being used to fuel labor for private companies and forced labor 
in other countries as well as America’s own history with slave labor.139 However, this particular 
concern is not more widespread due to the lack of awareness or day to day visibility of private 
prison labor. Supply chains are often obscured, consumers do not directly interact or know they 
are directly interacting with prisoners, and there are no laws requiring products produced by 
prisoners to be labeled as such. Many scholars also argue that there is a sort of reluctance to look 
critically at our society in many ways, but notably in the area of prison labor. Angela Davis 
writes: “there is reluctance to face the realities hidden within them, a fear of thinking about what 
happens inside them. Thus, the prison is present in our lives and, at the same time, it is absent 
from our lives.”140 
 The prison is a taboo, and yet, especially with the growth of prison labor, is an institution 
that is present in some capacity in everyone’s lives. However, when prison labor is brought to the 
surface and to the public’s attention, there is generally outrage that is difficult for some 
companies to shake. This can be seen in the fact that Victoria’s Secret is still associated with 
prison labor from utilizing women’s prisons to sew undergarments in the 1990s, or in the case of 
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Whole Foods using prison farms for produce which caused outrage in 2015.141 These factors are 
all important as they create potentials for future interventions or actions that may have public and 
individual backing. To individual’s core sense of fairness, concern for human rights, and 
businesses’ understanding of public perception and potential decreased profitability, there are 
clear reasons to publicly speak out against prison labor. However, if actions are not taken to 
bring this problem out of obscurity, there may be little that can be done to stop public 
indifference and ignorance.  
Potential Solutions 
 There are many potential solutions to the negative effects of private prison labor which can 
be taken by the private sector itself. The most obvious solution on the part of the consumer or 
individual company, is simply to stop purchasing and supporting organizations that profit from 
prison labor that has been shown to have negative human rights or non-incarcerated labor 
precarity consequences. Boycotts, divestment, and supply chain interference can all be useful 
tools in forcing corporations to stop their utilization of private prison labor. They are also among 
the only tools that are sometimes viable for individuals without substantial power or financial 
influence to utilize. However, supply chains are not always as cut an dry as they are in cases of 
direct contracting, as was true in the cases of Tennier and Talon Industries. Supply chains are 
often obscured, with companies themselves not always knowing that inputs were produced by 
prisoners. Goodridge provides a good example of how this could realistically manifest, outlining 
how potatoes that were once harvested by prisoners could be sent to a manufacturer that makes 
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potato starch from them which then is sold to a distributor and put into a final item as an 
ingredient that is sold in stores by a final company.142  
 This is not an excuse for the lack of understanding of where inputs are sourced from, as it 
is the responsibility of companies to do their due diligence. However, companies with values that 
espouse equality and opportunity may unknowingly find themselves contributing to a system that 
hurts economically disadvantaged individuals and promoted increased incarceration and 
recidivism rates.143 These multiple levels of distance away from the original act of labor itself are 
not uncommon in today’s world, with cases of forced and slave labor abroad often manifesting in 
similar ways (think Nike and Apple labor scandals). However, there is an argument to be made 
that such labor practices should be substantially less opaque, allowing for consumers and 
businesses alike to have better understandings of where their products and inputs come from in 
order to more adequately inform their choices.  
Policy Recommendations  
Given all of these considerations there are some clear policy routes that could be pursued 
in order to make inroads towards less corrupt and harmful private prison labor practices. For one, 
state level databases (mirroring existing federal databases) could be mandated, forcing state level 
prison operations to disclose which companies are utilizing prisoner’s labor, thereby illuminating 
supply chains for consumers. A similar step could be taken on the part of corporations views of 
their own supply chains, with potential laws outlining disclosure requirements for producers of 
inputs likely having a similar effect on making the supply chain less opaque. Oversight is also 
strongly needed in both federal and state level private prisons alike. This is a key area where the 
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United States is in violation of international law, and by implementing higher standards of 
oversight, the human rights violations and severe undercutting of markets could be curtailed. On 
that note, a comprehensive policy delineating inmate minimum wages in state level institutions 
could be monumental in reducing the wage precarity and forced labor impacts of private prison 
labor. In a system where inmates make wages that are non-existent or insignificant, there would 
not be nearly as many opportunities to exploit prisoner’s labor and undercut private markets. 
Furthermore, campaign finance reforms, as well as regulations on lobbying could have an impact 
on how powerful companies are able to consolidate power and influence in the prisons they 
operate. As one final policy recommendation, the public and the International Labor 
Organization itself could place increased pressure on the United States to not only follow and 
abide by, but to ratify Convention 29 on forced labor. The United States has refused to do so, and 
there have not been substantial pressures from the public or international community to make 
this change happen. Larger than but also intrinsic to any policy recommendation’s impact is 
public support and political and economic pressure placed on politicians and corporations.  
Exploratory Conclusions 
 The largest barrier, and one of the reasons for the existence of this thesis, however, is the 
utter lack of publicly available data or research that has been done on private prison labor and its 
impacts. There are potentially thousands of corporations within the United States that directly 
benefit from the prison industrial complex as a whole and more specifically prison labor. What is 
not known is who these companies are, to what extent prison labor benefits them, how many jobs 
are lost to prison labor in the aggregate, prison labor’s effects on offshoring and repatriating 
labor, and dozens more questions. Even finding what reliable data on what wages are for 
prisoners in private institutions is nearly impossible today. Substantial future research is 
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necessary in order to establish the degree and scope of the problems private prison labor may 
cause, not only in terms of labor precarity, but human rights, psychological impact on prisoners,  
environmental degradation, effects on recidivism rates, and many, many other areas of potential 
impact. In order to adequately form any effective policy response, there must be some degree of 
effort made in producing future aggregate studies on the impacts that prison labor has on the 
United States political and economic realities as a whole. Absent that, smaller questions, such as 
the extent to which labor precarity is caused by private prison labor, will likely never be 
answered fully. This paper successfully offers a baseline evaluation of private prison labor’s 
effects on wage precarity, finding that to a measurable extent private prison labor contributes to 
wage precarity. With future substantial research, changes to this reality through both public and 
political pressures may eventually prove successful.  
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